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Abstract
The Japanese economy experienced a substantial increase and a
subsequent crash in land and stock prices in the 1980s and 90s. I
use a neoclassical growth model to determine how much of these as-
set price movements can be accounted for by the observed changes in
fundamentals of the Japanese economy; in particular changes in pro-
ductivity growth and government policy regarding land taxation. In
the model, corporations issue land-collateralized debt to reduce their
tax liabilities and the government follows a land-taxation policy that
is countercyclical to land prices. These features substantially mag-
nify the eﬀect of small shocks by reducing the required return on land.
With the model calibrated to Japanese data, I find that the observed
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changes in fundamentals cannot simultaneously account for the move-
ments in asset prices and macroeconomic variables. In particular,
with persistent changes in fundamentals, the observed asset prices can
be justified, but at the cost of counter-predicting macroeconomic vari-
ables.
Keywords: Japan, land prices, asset pricing, land taxation, general
equilibrium.
JEL Classification: G12, C68, O40, E62
1 Introduction
Japan experienced a significant increase in land prices in late 1980s. The
total value of Japanese land increased by 70% relative to GDP between 1984-
1990.1 This movement is even more striking given the fact that land values
were already quite high in early 80s; the Japanese archipelago was valued
at more than three times the size of GDP. For the U.S., the corresponding
figure is only 0.6 for the same period.2
The behavior of land prices has important implications for the market
value of Japanese corporations. More than a fourth of land value in Japan is
held by corporations and land constitutes almost a half of the total value of
corporate tangible assets (see Figure 1). For comparison, land accounts for
less than 10% of tangible assets for U.S. corporations. Given the importance
of land in corporate balance sheets, it is not surprising that the market value
of corporations in Japan also experienced a boom after 1984. By 1989, the
1See the appendix for all data sources and data construction.
2See Boone (1989) for more on the diﬀerences in land value to GDP ratios across
countries. In this paper, I do not directly explore cross-country diﬀerences; instead I take
the general level of Japanese land value as given and explore its time variation.
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Figure 1: Value of corporate land and capital relative to GDP
major Japanese stock indexes had almost tripled in value relative to GDP
(see Figure 2).3 Unlike the U.S., where the financing-mix of corporations is
heavily tilted towards equity, Japanese corporations are highly levered and
debt-financing (mainly through banks) constitutes about two thirds of total
market valuation. A substantial amount of new debt was accumulated by
Japanese corporations in this period as higher land prices translated into
new collateral against which they could borrow from banks.4
Land and equity prices sharply declined in the 90s, however, and the
asset price phenomenon of the late 80s has since been labeled a bubble [c.f.
Ito and Iwaisako (1995)]. In this paper, I use an applied general equilibrium
3The stock market peaked in 1989, a year before land prices. The lag in land values
could partially be due to delays in oﬃcial reporting however [Ishi (2001)].
4See Dinc and McGuire (2004) and also Gan (2003) on this issue.
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Figure 2: Stock market indexes relative to GDP (1984=100)
model similar to McGrattan and Prescott (2002) to determine how much of
these asset price movements can be accounted for by the observed changes
in fundamentals of the Japanese economy. In particular, I consider the
eﬀects of changes in total factor productivity (TFP) and government policy
regarding land-taxation.
The behavior of asset prices in this period closely mirror the overall
growth performance of the Japanese economy. Figure 3 plots Japanese
GDP detrended by 2.45%, the average growth rate of GDP between 1980-
2002. By 1990, the Japanese GDP was 16% above trend. A simple growth
accounting exercise reveals that the main culprit for this was the increase
in TFP growth. TFP grew at about 3.1% per year between 1984-1990
compared to only 1.2% in the decade preceding it. This increase may have
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Figure 3: Detrended GDP (1984=100)
also generated expectations of restoring the growth performance of the 60s
(when TFP grew by 6.9%). TFP growth, however, reversed in the 90s and
averaged only 1.0% per year between 1990-2002.
There were also important changes in government policy regarding land
taxation during the 80s and 90s. The eﬀective tax rate paid on Japanese
land holdings declined by almost two-fold between 1984-1991 (see Figure
4).5 The main culprit for this was not changes in the oﬃcial tax rate per
se, but rather the changes in assessed values of land for taxation purposes.
As market prices for land increased, the government raised the assessment
values at a lower pace so as not to increase the tax burden of landown-
ers. The eﬀective marginal tax rate on land holdings gradually declined
5See the appendix for more on land taxation in Japan in general and the construction
of the eﬀective tax rate on land. The main source used was Ishi (2001).
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Figure 4: Eﬀective marginal tax rate on corporate land holdings
from 1.4% to 0.8% between 1984-1991. In 1991, the Japanese government
legislated a comprehensive reform on land taxation which gradually raised
assessments of land values for tax purposes, and introduced a new national
Land Value Tax (LVT) at a rate of 0.3%. With these changes, the eﬀective
tax rate rose back to about 1.5% by 2000.6
The existing literature has reached mixed conclusions regarding the ques-
tion of whether the increase in Japanese land and stock prices in the late 80s
and their subsequent reversal can be explained by fundamentals. French
and Poterba (1990) and Ito and Iwaisako (1995) both argue that the asset
price increases cannot be explained by fundamentals alone; specifically the
decrease in the required rate of return is not large enough. Boone (1989)
6The LTV applied only to large landowners and was later phased out. As shown
in Figure 4, the exclusion of the LTV does not significantly change the overall picture
however.
6
and Stone and Ziemba (1993) argue that credit market and tax conditions
justify the bulk of the rise in asset prices in the late 80s. Mera (2000) ar-
gues that the government’s response to the asset price increases, especially
strengthening of the land related taxation, is the major culprit for the fall
of asset prices in the 90s. Nishimura et al. (1999) argues that the tax-
shelter and collateral services of land are quasi-rents and hence should be
included in analyzing land valuation. My paper diﬀers from the above in
that it utilizes a calibrated general equilibrium model instead of starting
from a reduced-form asset pricing equation. This clarifies the contribution
of each factor considered, makes the role of expectations more transparent,
and forces the model to be consistent with other macroeconomic aggregates
(such as investment and output) while accounting for asset prices.7
In the model, corporations issue land-collateralized debt similar to Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997) and deduct their interest payments from their tax
liabilities. The resulting tax-savings reduce the required rate of return on
land. With this feature, land values are high and more responsive to small
changes in the required return. An additional and important magnification
is due to the response of government to land price movements. The gov-
ernment reduces the eﬀective tax rate on land as land prices increase and
raises them as land prices decline. This policy exacerbates the movements
in land prices. I calibrate the parameters of the model to match certain
features of Japanese data and run simulations. I find that the observed
changes in fundamentals cannot simultaneously account for the movements
7Cochrane (2008), for example, argues that when evaluating an asset pricing expla-
nation, consistency with macroeconomic aggregates is as important as consistency with
financial variables.
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in asset prices and macroeconomic variables. In particular, if agents cor-
rectly expect the changes in TFP growth to be temporary, the model can
account for the movements in macroeconomic aggregates, but not in asset
prices. If, however, agents expect persistent changes in TFP growth, the
movements in land values can be fully and the movements in equity val-
ues can be partially justified. This comes at the cost of counter-predicting
macroeconomic variables however.
The next section lays out the model economy. Section 3 derives the main
theoretical results on land and corporate valuation from the model. Section
4 presents the calibration of the model to Japanese data. The quantitative
findings from the model are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
In this section, I present a general equilibrium asset pricing model with
production and capital accumulation similar to McGrattan and Prescott
(2002). Infinitely-lived households are shareholders of corporations which
carry out production activities. Land is used as an input in production as
well as collateral for corporate borrowing. There is also a government that
taxes households and firms to finance its expenditures.
2.1 The Stand-in Household
The population in period t is denoted by Nt and η is the constant growth
factor of population, so Nt+1 = ηNt. Agents are endowed with a unit
8
of time each period which they allocate between labor and leisure. The
stand-in household’s preferences over the consumption good and leisure are
described by the following utility function:
E0
∞X
t=0
βtu (ct, ht)Nt
where
u (ct, ht) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
h
cαt (1− ht)1−α
i1−σ
/ (1− σ) if σ 6= 1
α log ct + (1− α) log (1− ht) if σ = 1
t indexes time, β < 1 is the constant discount factor, α regulates the im-
portance of consumption relative to leisure within period utility, σ is the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, c is the consumption
good and h is labor time.
Household members own the corporations, and participate in an asset
market where perfectly divisible shares of these firms are traded. They earn
labor income and receive dividends from their ownership of the firms. They
also lend to corporations and receive interest income from their lending.
The household’s period budget constraint is given by
(1 + τ c)Ntct + vt (st+1 − st) + bt+1 − bt
≤ (1− τh)wtNtht +
³
1− τhd
´
dtst + (1− τ b) rb,t−1bt + Tt
where s is the amount of firm shares, v is the price of a share and d is
9
per-share dividends paid out by corporations. Dividend income is taxed
at a rate of τhd at the household level. b denotes the amount of lending to
corporations from which households earn interest at a rate of rb. Households
cannot borrow from corporations, hence bt ≥ 0 for all t. w denotes the wage
rate. Households receive lump-sum transfers T from the government and
pay proportional taxes τ b on their interest income, τh on their labor income
and τ c on their consumption expenditures.
2.2 Corporations
Corporations operate a constant-returns-to-scale technology that uses ser-
vices of capital k, land l, and labor h as inputs to produce the output good
y. Their technology is described by
yt = e(1−θk)atk
θk
t l
θl
t (Ntht)
θh , θk + θl + θh = 1
where exp {(1− θk) at} is the level of total factor productivity (TFP) in the
corporate sector, and θk, θl and θh are the shares of capital, land and labor
in production respectively. Without loss of generality, I set the initial level
of TFP to 1 (i.e. a0 = 0).
The law of motion of capital accumulation is described by
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + xt
where x is new investment and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Corporations own the capital and land they use as inputs in production
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and in turn pay dividends to their shareholders. I assume there is a single
unit of shares outstanding each period, and the corporations do not engage in
issuance of new shares or stock buybacks. They also borrow from households
and pay interest on their borrowing. Shareholders are the residual claimants
on the income of corporations, hence dividends paid to shareholders (after
corporate income tax on distributed earnings) are equal to firm income plus
new borrowing less payments for wages, investments, interest on debt and
taxes on corporate income and property holdings:
dt = yt − wtNtht − (1− τx)xt − qt (lt+1 − lt) + bt+1 − (1 + rb,t−1) bt
−τkkt − τ l (Ωt, qt) qtlt − τy [yt −wtNtht − δkt − rb,t−1bt] + (τy − τ cd) dt
Corporations receive subsidies from the government at a rate of τx; also
pay proportional taxes at a rate of τk on their capital holdings, and τ l (Ωt, qt)
on the value of land holdings. Note that the tax schedule on land holdings
is dependent on the price of land, q, and the target land tax revenue of the
government, Ω. Corporate profits are taxed at a rate of τy except for the
portion that is paid out as dividends which is taxed at a lower rate of τ cd.
Note that the firm can deduct depreciation of capital and interest payments
on its debt when calculating the base for their income tax, however they
cannot deduct property taxes paid on capital and land holdings.8
Corporate borrowing is nonnegative and is constrained above by a certain
fraction φ > 0 of the value of their tangible asset holdings similar to Kiyotaki
8These are features of the tax code in Japan and diﬀer slightly from the U.S. system.
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and Moore (1997):9
0 ≤ bt+1 ≤ φ [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1]
Corporations’ problem is to maximize the present value of after-tax div-
idend earnings of households,
E0
∞X
t=0
pt (1− τd) dt
where pt denotes the rate at which corporations discount future dividend
payments.10
2.3 The Government
The government runs a balanced budget each period financing its consump-
tion, transfers to households and subsidies to corporations by tax receipts.
The budget constraint of the government is given by
gt + Tt + τxxt ≤ tax revenue.
The government expenditures as a share of output is a constant ψ, hence
gt = ψyt.
9Note that the price of a unit of capital in terms of the output good is (1− τx).
10As customary, I assume corporations discount at the same rate with their shareholders;
i.e. pt is equal to the stand-in household’s marginal utility of period t consumption at
period 0.
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The government follows a countercyclical land-taxation policy given by
τ l (Ωt, qt) =
Ωt
qtl
where l is the total amount of land in the economy, and Ωt is the amount of
tax revenue the government targets to collect from land taxation. I assume
that this target grows at a rate of η

θh
1−θk

e∆at , hence
Ωt = Ω
∙
η

θh
1−θk

t
eat
¸
where Ω denotes the initial target level at t = 0. This ensures that on a
balanced growth path, the target land tax revenue grows at the same rate
with all the other aggregate variables in the model.
2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
The final good y can be used for household consumption, c, investment in
new capital, x, or government consumption, g:
Ntct + xt + gt = yt
The total amount of land in the economy is fixed at l (which is set at
unity without loss of generality); hence the clearing condition for the land
market is
lt = l = 1.
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The market clearing condition for corporate shares is given by
st = 1.
2.5 Technology Shocks
There’s an AR(1) process on the change in the productivity factor, ∆a,
given by
¡
∆at+1 −∆a
¢
= ρ
¡
∆at −∆a
¢
+ εt+1
where
∆at+1 = at+1 − at
∆a is the mean of the process, and ε is an i.i.d. normal shock with mean
zero. Note that the innovations to the technology shock are not on the
level, but on the growth of TFP similar to King et al. (1988).
Competitive equilibrium for this model economy is then defined as a se-
quence of prices and allocations such that the stand-in household maximizes
utility subject to its budget constraint, corporations maximize the present
value of after-tax dividends, and the government’s budget constraint and
the market clearing conditions are satisfied.
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3 Valuation of Land and Corporate Equity in the
Model
In this section, I first discuss the debt-financing decision of corporations and
then derive expressions for land and corporate equity valuation in the model.
I also explore the qualitative eﬀects of changes in productivity growth and
taxes on asset prices.
3.1 Debt-Financing Decision
In the model, the decision regarding the level of corporate debt is based solely
on tax incentives. With no taxes, the debt level is indeterminate since the
Modigliani-Miller propositions hold and the debt-equity mix is irrelevant. In
the presence of taxation, however, debt-financing may be favored by the tax
code. Since the interest paid on debt is deductible from corporate taxable
income, debt-financing creates a tax shelter for corporations [Modigliani and
Miller (1958) and Miller (1977)]. On the other hand, interest income is taxed
at the household level. Since households are shareholders as well as lenders
to corporations, the optimal level of corporate debt depends on taxation of
corporate income vs. interest income. This argument is formalized by the
following proposition:
15
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the level of corporate debt is
bt+1 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1] if τy > τ b
0 if τy < τ b
[ 0 , φ [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1] ] if τy = τ b.
Proof. See the appendix.
When corporate profits are taxed more heavily than interest income (as
is the case for Japan), there is an incentive for issuing corporate debt to
reduce the overall tax burden.11 If there were no constraints on borrowing,
debt would increase up to a level that would make taxable income zero
and hence exhaust all the tax shelter opportunity. Given the collateral
constraint on debt, however, corporations borrow only up to this constraint;
hence the collateral constraint binds in every period.12
3.2 Land Valuation
It is not possible to characterize the equilibrium land value in the model
analytically (short of writing it as an infinite sum), therefore I derive an
expression for land value relative to output along the balanced growth path
of the model.
11See the appendix for more on taxation in Japan.
12The collateral constraint is assumed to be tight enough such that taxable income never
reduces to zero in equilibrium. This is indeed the case given the calibrated parameters of
the model.
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Definition Balanced Growth Path
The balanced growth path of the model economy is such that
1. Aggregate variables capital, k, investment, x, government expenditure,
g, debt, b, value per share, v, land price, q, dividends, d, transfers, T ,
and target land-tax revenue, Ω, all grow at the same rate with growth
factor γ.
2. Per-capita variables consumption, c, and per-hour wage, w, grow with
γ/η.
3. Per-capita labor hours, h, total shares, s, interest rate, rb, and quantity
of land, l, stay constant.
When the productivity factor grows at a constant rate, i.e. ∆at = ∆a,
the model economy has a balanced growth path with
γ = η
θh
1−θk e∆a.
Proposition 2 Given τy > τ b, the value of land relative to output along
the balanced growth path is
ql
y
=
(1− τy) γθl
(1 + r − γ)− φ (τy − τ b) rb + γτ l
where
r = (1− τ b) rb =
(γ/η)1−α(1−σ)
β
− 1
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and τ l is the tax rate on land holdings that prevails along the balanced growth
path when Ω and q grow at the same rate.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the share of
income that accrues to land (shadow rental income) is equal to the share
of land in production, θl. The above proposition states that the value of
land relative to output is the present value of the (after-tax) income share
of land discounted by the appropriate required rate of return. The tax
shelter benefit from the debt collateralized by land lowers the required rate
of return (as implied by the second expression in the denominator), while
the tax on land holdings increases it, relative to the required return on
other assets. The tax shelter benefit, as expected, depends on the fraction
of assets that can be collateralized, the tax diﬀerential between corporate
income and interest income, and the interest rate on corporate bonds.
The required return on land also includes a risk-premium component
which is ignored in the above expression. Note, however, that the risk
premiums generated from this model (and from similar models that abstract
from features such as habit formation utility and costs to capital adjustment)
is rather small [c.f. Jermann (1998)].13
In the above land pricing equation, the γ next to θl in the numerator,
and the γ next to τ l in the denominator appear due to the fact that the land
price in the model is the end-of-period price and hence current land price,
13Habit formation utility and adjustment costs to capital have not been added not to
complicate the model any further. Whether changes in risk premia can account for the
observed changes in asset prices is left for further research.
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qt, excludes the value of the current returns from land at period t. This
is explained further in the next subsection where I generate the above land
pricing equation using a dividend growth model similar to Gordon (1962).
3.2.1 Land Price using a Dividend Growth Model
The price (actually the intrinsic value) of an asset is determined by the
present value of the future stream of payments it generates. For the case of
land, the relevant payment includes not only the (after-tax) return earned
from renting land, but also the tax shelter benefits generated from using land
as collateral for debt. Property taxes paid on land holdings are subtracted
from each period’s payment.
Consider a unit of land whose price at the end of period t (i.e. excluding
period t payments) is designated as qt. At each period t, it generates Dt
units of rental income, which is taxed at a constant rate of τy, and also
a tax-shelter benefit of size φ (τy − τ b) rbqt−1. Note that the period t tax
shelter benefit depends on debt acquired last period, bt, which is a function
of qt−1 not qt. At each period t, landowners also pay land taxes of size τ lqt.
Assume that the rental income D (and hence land price q) increases each
period by a constant growth factor γ, hence Dt+1 = γDt. Also assume that
future payments are discounted by a constant gross interest rate, 1 + r.
19
Land price at period 0 can then be written as
q0 =
(1− τy)D1 + φ (τy − τ b) rbq0 − τ lq1
1 + r
+
[(1− τy)D1 + φ (τy − τ b) rbq0 − τ lq1] γ
(1 + r)2
+
[(1− τy)D1 + φ (τy − τ b) rbq0 − τ lq1] γ2
(1 + r)3
+ ....
Imposing D1 = γD0 and q1 = γq0, the above infinite sum can be solved to
get14
q0 =
(1− τy) γD0
1 + r − γ − φ (τy − τ b) rb + γτ l
.
Multiplying both sides of the above expression by the total quantity of
land, and dividing by total output gives precisely the land-price expression
generated from the steady-state of the model presented in section 2.15
3.2.2 The Eﬀect of Growth on Land Value
In this subsection, I explore the qualitative eﬀects of a change in the growth
factor on land prices. For the discussion here, I assume that land taxes stay
constant and discuss the magnification eﬀects due to endogenous land taxes
in the next subsection.
A higher growth rate does not necessarily generate a higher asset price in
this model (and in similar models). The eﬀect of growth on land valuation
is ambiguous because a higher growth rate not only translates into higher
rents from land but may also increase the real interest rates with which
14Note that the condition, γ < 1 + r, is needed for this infinite series to converge.
15Note that the D0l0/y0 is the income share of land which is a constant and is equal to
the share of land in production, θl.
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these rents are discounted.16 To generate an increase in land values with
higher growth, the model essentially requires the interest rate to increase less
than the increase in the growth rate. This argument, of course, assumes a
constant land tax.17
The parameter σ, which is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, is important in determining the extent to which the interest
rate reacts to changes in the growth factor. Note that
1 + r =
(γ/η)1−α(1−σ)
β
.
With unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e. σ = 1), the increase
in the interest rate is almost of the same magnitude as the increase in the
growth rate; hence permanently higher growth has almost no impact on land
values across steady-states. That is not true of the transition path, however.
The interest rate adjusts upwards as the economy goes from one balanced
growth path to another, but only slowly since the capital stock cannot jump.
This implies that during the transition, the increase in growth overtakes the
increase in the interest rate and can create an increase in the value of land
even with σ = 1.
Note that σ is also the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in this model.
The equity premium literature typically finds that risk aversion needs to be
rather high to account for the observed equity premiums in the data [Mehra
and Prescott (1985)]. Increasing σ, however, decreases the elasticity of
16See also Boldrin and Levine (2001) and Peralta-Alva (2003) on the same issue.
17Note that eﬀects of the γ next to θl in the numerator, and the γ next to τ l in the
denominator of the asset pricing equation are small and can be ignored for the purpose of
this discussion.
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intertemporal substitution, which causes the steady-state interest rate to
rise more in the face of an increase in the growth factor. In fact, for large
enough σ, the model generates a decrease in asset prices as growth of the
economy picks up.18 With higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
(i.e. when 0 < σ < 1), the increase in the steady-state interest rate is lower
than the increase in the growth factor. This can potentially generate a
sizable increase in asset prices, especially during the transition. The caveat
here, however, is the implication of very low risk aversion.19
3.2.3 Magnification of the Eﬀect of Growth due to Endogenous
Land Taxation
As argued in the previous subsection, the model with a constant tax rate
on land, can generate an increase in land values across steady-states (and
along the transition path) as a result of an increase in the growth rate of the
economy. This increase is quantitatively small however, unless one assumes
an unreasonably low elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Endogenous land taxes, whereby the tax rate on land is countercyclical
to land prices, amplify this initial impact of growth on land values. The
initial increase in land values reduces the tax rate on land. This reduces
18This seems to be at odds with the land price data in Japan, where changes in land
prices are correlated positively with changes in growth rates. The urban land price indexes
of the Japanese Real Estate Institute increased during the high growth years of the 60s
and late 80s, and fell during the low growth periods of 70s and 90s.
19Epstein-Zin or habit formation preferences could potentially solve this problem since
they break the link between risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. See
Cochrane (2008) for more on this issue.
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the required return on land, which causes land values to increase further,
which, in turn, causes a further reduction in the land tax rate and so on.
The equilibrium as a result of this circular interaction of land tax rates and
land values, encompasses a much higher increase in land values relative to
an equilibrium with constant land taxes.
To assess the quantitative importance of this magnification in my model,
I conduct a rough back-of-the-envelope calculation using the land pricing
equation of Proposition 2. As discussed in the next section on calibration,
the value of corporate land relative to corporate output, ql/y, is about 1.5
and the after-tax income share of land, (1− τy) θl, is about 2.5%. This
implies a required return on land of about 1.7%.20 The observed decrease
in the land tax rate from 1.4% to 0.8% reduces this required return to
1.1%. This, in percentage terms is a 35% decrease in the required return
and hence generates a 35% increase in the land value to output ratio across
steady-states. Note that this calculation ignores the eﬀects of the increase
in the growth rate of the economy and considers the eﬀect of a change in
the land tax as if it is exogenously imposed. The increase in growth would
drive the initial required return below 1.7%, and hence a 0.6 percentage
point decrease in the land tax would translate into a bigger reduction in the
required return and hence a bigger increase in land values, especially along
a transition path.
20Note that with the calibrated values, the required return after accounting for growth,
r − γ, is about 1.5%. The tax shelter component, φ (τy − τ b) rb, reduces the required
return by about 1.2%, and the land tax increases it by about 1.4%.
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3.3 Valuation of Corporate Equity
In the model, the first order condition of the stand-in household with respect
to corporate shares is given by
Et
n
pt+1
h³
1− τhd
´
dt+1 + vt+1
io
= ptvt.
This expression can be solved forward to yield the familiar result that the
price of a share is equal to the present value of after-tax dividends the share
generates:
vt =
∞X
m=1
µ
pt+m
pt
¶³
1− τhd
´
dt+m
When we also consider the first order conditions of the firm, the current
price of a share can be expressed as the current after-tax value of the tangible
assets owned by a corporation minus its debt (see Proposition 3). This result
hinges on the assumption of perfect competition among corporations. With
market power, corporate equity value would reflect not only the value of the
tangible (and intangible if applicable) assets, but also the present value of
the pure rents resulting from market power.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the equity value of corporations is
vt = (1− τd) (1− φ) [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1]
where
τd =
τhd + τ
c
d − τy
1 + τ cd − τy
.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Note that τd is the eﬀective tax rate on dividends taking into account
the preferential treatment that dividends receive at the corporate level vis-
à-vis corporate income taxation. With equal corporate income tax rates
on retained earnings and dividend payments, τd equals the dividend income
tax paid at the household level, τhd .
To gain some intuition for the above equity pricing expression, consider
a firm that sells a (real) dollar worth of its tangible assets to another firm.
The firm spends a fraction, φ, of the revenue to buy back debt in order to
avoid violating its collateral constraint. The rest of the revenue, 1 − φ, is
taxed at an eﬀective rate of τd when it is distributed back to shareholders.
The remainder is attributed to the value of corporate equity.
Since land constitutes about half of corporate holdings, a doubling of
land prices should result in about a 50% increase in equity values according
to the equity pricing formula above. This implies that even if the model
is able to fully generate the observed increase in land values, it will not be
able to generate the doubling (or even tripling) of equity values observed in
the data.
4 Calibration
To calibrate the parameters of the model economy, I follow Cooley and
Prescott (1995) and match the balanced growth path of the model to the
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corresponding features of Japanese data. I calibrate all parameters using
data from the early 80s, to match the initial conditions prior to the rise
in the asset prices, except for the growth parameters which are calibrated
using averages from 1980-2002.
The parameters to be calibrated are the growth parameters γ, η and ∆a,
preference parameters β, σ and α, technology parameters δ, θk, θl and θh,
collateral constraint parameter φ, government policy parameters ψ and Ω,
and tax rates τ l, τ c, τh, τ b, τhd , τy, τ
c
d, τk and τx.
I start with the tax parameters which are further discussed in detail
in the Appendix. The eﬀective marginal tax rate on corporate income
averaged 55.2% for retained earnings and 44.9% for income paid out as
dividends between 1980-1984; hence I set τy equal to 0.552 and τ cd to 0.449.
The steady-state eﬀective marginal tax rate on corporate holdings of land,
τ l, and on corporate holdings of capital, τk, were similarly found as 1.41%
and 1.17% respectively. I set τx to match the ratio of business subsidies to
investment in 1980-84 which is 4.88% and τ c to the ratio of indirect taxes
on products to consumption which is 7.44%. The individual income taxes
on interest τ b, dividends τhd and labor income τh are set at 19%, 45% and
43% respectively given the considerations laid out in the appendix.
Between 1980-2002, Japanese real GDP grew at an average rate of 2.45%
per year, and its working age population (age 15-64) grew by 0.40% per
year.21 I therefore set the growth factor parameters γ and η equal to
1.0245 and 1.0040 respectively.
The preference parameter, σ, is set equal to 1 which implies unit in-
21See the Appendix for data sources.
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tertemporal elasticity of substitution following Prescott (1986) and Cooley
and Prescott (1995). I conduct sensitivity analysis on this parameter in the
results section due to its importance in determining asset prices as argued
previously in section 3.
The remaining parameters ∆a, β, α, δ, θk , θl, θh, φ, ψ and Ω are then
recursively calibrated using the model economy’s balanced growth path re-
lationships and the data counterparts of the following variables: the share
of total consumption in output (Nc/y), the share of labor in total income
(wNh/y), the debt to equity ratio (b0/v), the ratio of depreciation of corpo-
rate fixed capital to corporate capital (δk/k), the capital-output ratio (k/y),
the total land value relative to output
¡
ql/y
¢
, and labor hours per person
(h). The next subsections discuss how the data counterparts of these vari-
ables are obtained from the Japanese National Accounts and are used to
calibrate the remaining parameters.
4.1 The Japanese National Accounts
Table 1 summarizes the Japanese expenditure and income accounts obtained
from the National Income Accounts (NIA) of Japan. An adjustment has
been made to private consumption data on the expenditure side and to net
indirect business taxes on the income side to conform the data with the
model’s expenditure and income accounts.22 I subtract tax on products
from total private consumption and discard it from net indirect business
taxes. This adjustment reduces total expenditure and income by 4%.
22Note that in the data, consumption is valued at market price which includes the tax
on products.
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NIA Concept (relative to output) Data (1980-84)
Expenditure
Consumption
Private 0.534
Government 0.143
Investment
Corporate 0.172
Noncorporate (incl. gov.) 0.141
Net Exports 0.010
Total Expenditure 1
Income
Labor Compensation 0.566
Operating Surplus
Corporate 0.132
Noncorporate 0.141
of which owner-occ. housing 0.038
Depreciation
Corporate 0.087
Noncorporate 0.058
Net Indirect Taxes 0.025
Statistical Discrepancy -0.009
Total Income 1
Table 1: National Income Accounts
Private consumption constituted 53.4% of total expenditure in Japan
between 1980-1984. I assume the share of consumption goods in corporate
output is the same as the total and set Nc/y equal to 0.534. To calcu-
late the labor share in income, wNh/y, I distribute the non-housing part
of non-corporate operating surplus (o.s.) and the statistical discrepency
proportional to the rest of the economy; hence labor share is given by
labor share =
labor comp.
labor comp.+corp. o.s.+non-corp. housing+net ind. taxes
.
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The labor share averaged 64.2% between 1980-1984, hence I set wNh/y
equal to 0.642.
Table 2 summarizes the Japanese sectoral balance sheet data again ob-
tained from NIA.23 The corporate sector includes all financial and non-
financial corporations. Intercorporate holdings of debt and equity have
been netted out in the calculation of the market value of corporations.24
Balance Sheet Concept (relative to output) Data (1980-84)
Capital Stocks (beginning of period)
Corporate 1.217
Noncorporate 1.175
Total Value of Capital 2.392
Value of Land (end of period)
Corporate 0.910
Noncorporate 2.511
Total Value of Land 3.421
Market Value of Corporations (end of period)
Debt 0.689
Equity 0.281
Debt-Equity Ratio 2.447
Table 2: Tangible Assets and Market Value
The end-of-period debt to equity ratio, b0/v, is set to 2.447, which is the
average of its data counterpart for 1980-1984. The ratio of depreciation of
corporate fixed capital to corporate capital is 7.2% for 1980-1984, hence I
set δk/k equal to 0.072.
23Note that the capital stock is reported on a beginning-of-period basis which as a
ratio to output corresponds to kt/yt in the model. Similarly, the end-of-period value of
land relative to output corresponds to qtl/yt, the end-of-period debt relative to output
corresponds to bt+1/yt and the end-of-period equity relative to output corresponds to
vt/yt.
24This is crucial in the case of Japan since the non-corporate sector holds only about
30% of all corporate equity. The rest is intercorporate holdings of shares.
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To find corporate capital and land holdings relative to corporate output,
I first need to determine the value added of the corporate sector relative
to total income. I use the share of corporations in total operating surplus
(attributed to capital) plus total depreciation (dep.) as a proxy for the share
of corporate value added; hence
corp. share =
corp. o.s.+corp. dep.
total o.s.-labor share*(noncorp. o.s.-owner occ. housing)+total dep
.
Using income account data from Table 1, the corporate share in total value
added is estimated as 0.624%.
The ratio of corporate capital to total output is 1.217.25 Since corpo-
rate output makes 62.4% of total output, the capital-output ratio for the
corporate sector, k/y, is set to 1.951. Similarly, the value of corporate land
relative to total output was 0.912 which yields a corporate land value to
corporate output ratio, ql/y, of 1.459.
Figure 5 plots the weekly labor hours per working age person in Japan
between 1980-2002. The average for 1980-1984 is 30.3 hours. Assuming
people have a total of 100 non-sleep hours in a week, the ratio of labor hours
in total available time, h, is set to 0.303. Note that labor hours in Japan
dropped in the 90s mainly as a result of workweek length legislation which
called for the reduction of labor hours per worker from 44 to 40 hours by
1997 [Hayashi and Prescott (2002)].
25Note that the ratio of corporate capital to total output reported here is slightly higher
than what is shown in Figure 1 in the introduction. This is due to the downward adjust-
ment made to total output.
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Figure 5: Weekly labor hours per working age person (15-64)
4.2 Matching Model’s Balanced Growth with Data
The depreciation parameter, δ, is calibrated to match the ratio of depreci-
ation of corporate fixed capital to corporate capital, δk/k = 0.072. Along
the balanced growth path (and outside it, in this case), the end-of-period
debt to equity ratio is given by26
b0
v
=
φ
1− φ
1− (τy − τ cd)¡
1− τhd
¢ .
The fraction of assets that can be collateralized, φ, is calibrated to 0.600
using the above expression. The firm’s first order condition evaluated along
26Note that in the data, debt is reported on a book value basis and only listed shares
are reported as equity. This implies that the reported values for both debt and equity
are below their total market value. That is why I chose to calibrate φ to match the debt
to equity ratio, rather than match debt or equity by itself.
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the balanced growth is
θh = wNh/y.
I therefore calibrate the share of labor in production, θh, to match the labor
share in the data, 0.642. This implies that the sum of the capital and land
shares, θk + θl, equal to 0.358.
Evaluating the firm’s first order condition with respect to capital along
the balanced growth path yields the following expression:
θk =
(1− τy) (k/y)
(1− τx) [1− τ b − φ (τy − τ b)] rb + (1− τx − τy) δ + τk
The share of land in production can similarly be expressed along the bal-
anced growth path as
θl =
(1− τy) γ
¡
ql/y
¢
[1 + (1− τ b) rb − γ]− φ (τy − τ b) rb + γτ l
.
These two expressions, coupled with θk+θl = 0.358, imply that the interest
rate on corporate bonds, rb, along the steady-state is 4.94%.27 This interest
rate is then used in the above balanced growth path expressions to calibrate
the capital share parameter, θk, to 0.297 and the land share parameter, θl,
to 0.061.
I calibrate the steady-state growth rate of TFP, ∆a, to 0.0204 using
γ = η
θh
1−θk e∆a.
27Note that the implied (net) real interest rate, r, is 4% since r = (1− τ b) rb.
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The share of consumption in the utility function, α, is calibrated to 0.405
using the following relationship (which comes out of evaluating the house-
hold’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure along
the balanced growth path):
1− α
α
=
1− τh
1 + τ c
θh
Nc/y
1− h
h
Similarly I calibrate the discount factor, β, to 0.981 using the following
balanced growth path condition:
(1− τ b) rb =
(γ/η)1−α(1−σ)
β
− 1
The goods market clearing condition along the balanced growth path
can be written as
Nc
y
+ [γ − (1− δ)] k
y
+ ψ = 1.
This is used to calibrate the ratio of government expenditure to corporate
output, ψ, to 0.279. The implied investment-output ratio for the corporate
sector is then 18.8%.
The calibrate the parameter for the initial target land tax revenue, Ω,
first note that, at t = 0 and along the balanced growth path, the land tax
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revenue as a share of output can be written as28
Ω
y0
= τ l
µ
q0l
y0
¶
.
Since at t = 0, the level of TFP factor, a0, equals 0, and the population is
normalized to 1 (i.e. N0 = 1), the initial target land tax revenue, Ω, is set
to 0.0091 using the following expression:
Ω =
"µ
k
y
¶θk
l
θlhθh
# 1
1−θk
µ
τ l
ql
y
¶
Table 3 below reports the National Accounts implied from the model
(which includes only the corporate sector) along the balanced growth path.
In the data, the ratios of corporate debt and corporate equity relative to
corporate output are 1.12 and 0.46 respectively. The model, however, im-
plies debt and equity levels which are almost twice as high as their data
counterparts. This is expected since the reported debt and equity levels in
the data are below total market value as argued previously.
The implied government expenditure from the model is 27.9% of corpo-
rate output. This number is high relative to the data (which is 14.3% of
total output), but not unreasonably high if one is to assume that most the
government consumption expenditure in the data involves corporate goods.
Also note that along the balanced growth path of the model, the size of the
lumpsum transfers from the government to the stand-in household, T/y, is
28This implies that the ratio of land revenue to output is about 2%. This is slightly
higher than the data since the marginal tax on land is greater than the average tax due
to exemptions.
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National Accounts (relative to corp. output) Model
Expenditure
Consumption 0.534
Government Expenditure 0.279
Investment 0.188
Total Expenditure 1
Income
Labor Compensation 0.642
Operating Surplus 0.218
Depreciation 0.140
Total Income 1
Balance Sheet
Capital Stock ( k/y) 1.951
Value of land (v/y) 1.459
Debt (b0/y) 2.016
Equity (v/y) 0.824
Debt-Equity Ratio (b0/v) 2.447
Table 3: Summary of parameter values
about 16.4% of output.
5 Simulations and Quantitative Findings
In this section, I first briefly discuss the computation procedure and the
calculation of the TFP series that is fed as innovations into the model’s
stochastic process. I then present the model’s quantitative predictions
on asset prices and macroeconomic variables using simulations from the
calibrated model economy.
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5.1 Computation
First I transform all model variables to ensure stationarity. Let eut denote
the detrended value of ut for each variable u and define
eut =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ut/
∙
η

θh
1−θk

t
eat−1
¸
for u = k and b
ut/
∙
η

θh
1−θk

t
eat
¸
for u = x, g, v, q, d, T and Ω
ut/
∙
η
 −θl
1−θk

t
eat
¸
for u = c and w
ut/
"µ
βη
−α(1−σ) θl
1−θk
¶t
e[α(1−σ)−1]at
#
for u = p
ut for u = h, s, rb, l and ∆a
Note that capital stock, k, and the level of debt, b, are detrended using TFP
levels for period t− 1. These transformations render the model stationary
in ∆at.
I then log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the stationary
model’s steady-state and use the Blanchard-Kahn method [Blanchard and
Kahn (1980)] to find the policy function for each variable.
5.2 Calculating TFP
I take the corporate production function in the model
yt = e(1−θk)at k
θk
t l
θl
t (Ntht)
θh
and set the share parameters for capital, land and labor to their calibrated
values in section 4. I assume the quantity of land is a constant each period
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Figure 6: Change in productivity factor, ∆a
(equal to 1 without loss of generality) and construct a productivity factor
series, {at}, using data on real GDP, real capital stock and total labor
hours.29 I then take the first diﬀerence of this series to arrive at the change
in the productivity factor series, {∆at}, where ∆at = at − at−1 (see Figure
6).
The deviations of the change in productivity factor from the steady-state
are then calculated as d∆at = ∆at −∆a
where ∆a is the average change in the productivity factor. For 1980-2002,
this average change is equal to 2.03% which is in line with the calibrated
29Note that using corporate capital instead of aggregate capital produces almost iden-
tical results for the change in productivity factor series as shown in Figure 6. I used the
GDP deflator to deflate the capital stock series. Using the investment deflator instead
also produces very similar results.
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value of ∆a found in section 4. This is also the average growth of produc-
tivity observed for the U.S. economy in the postwar period. The average
for 1980-1984, however, is only 0.79%. This implies that the early 80s are
probably a little below the steady-state and hence the increase in the pro-
ductivity factor in the late 80s are somewhat higher than what is implied
from using 2.03% for ∆a. I therefore calculate the d∆at series using ∆a =
0.79% to account for the bigger innovations. As shown in the next subsec-
tion, this will ensure that the model matches the macroeconomic variables,
especially output, for the late 80s. Using ∆a = 2.03%, however, does not
change the main results presented in the next two subsections.30
I then run an AR(1) regression on the change in productivity growth
series to estimate the persistence parameter for the TFP shock, ρ. I use the
estimated parameter value, 0.438, in the benchmark simulation and then
conduct sensitivity analysis on this parameter.
5.3 Benchmark Simulation
For the simulations, I set the model economy to be along a balanced growth
path between 1980-1984 and feed the
nd∆ato values for the years 1985-2002
calculated in the previous subsection into the model.
Figure 7 plots the predicted time series for the value of land relative to
output, ql/y, the tax rate on land, τ l, equity to output ratio, v/y, and debt
to output ratio, b0/y, against their data counterparts.31 With temporary
30The main issue is the persistence of the shocks; the size of the shocks is of secondary
importance.
31 In generating the time series for the ratios relative to corporate output in the data, the
share of corporate value added in total output is assumed to be 62.4% for all years. This
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shocks, the model generates essentially flat asset price profiles with land
values rising only 1.3% relative to output at its highest level in 1988 and
actually declining 0.7% between 1984-1990.
The model matches the observed patterns of macroeconomic aggregates
relatively well, especially for the 80s (see Figure 8). Faced with a temporary
increase in the growth rate of TFP, investment activity picks up temporarily
which reduces the share of consumption in total output. Despite the increase
in investment, the capital output ratio declines in the short-run as the growth
in output is higher than the growth in the capital stock. Labor hours are
also increased temporarily to take advantage of the temporary increase in
productivity. In the 90s, the patterns are reversed as the growth of TFP
declines. The reversal in the data is sharper mainly due to the decrease
in the workweek length and the decline in the growth rate of population,
neither of which are captured by my model [Hayashi and Prescott (2002)].
The predictions regarding flat asset price profiles are robust to using
higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e. lower σ), and/or higher
debt to equity ratio (i.e. higher φ) in calibrating the model. Lowering σ to
0.1 generates a maximum increase of only 2% in ql/y. Similarly, calibrating
the model to a debt to equity ratio of 10 (i.e. φ = 0.86) generates a maximum
increase of only 1.5%.32
value corresponds to the corporate share averaged for 1980-84 as found in the calibration
section.
32Note that with any of these changes, the whole model is recalibrated to match the
data ratios spelled out in the calibration section.
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Figure 7: Benchmark Simulation: Asset Prices
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Figure 8: Benchmark Simulation: Macroeconomic Aggregates
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5.4 Productivity shocks with higher persistence
The predictions on asset prices are more in line with the data, when I increase
the persistence of the TFP shocks.33 For example, with the persistence
parameter, ρ, set to 0.99, the model can generate a 77.5% increase in land
values and 30% increase in equity values relative to output (see Figure 9).34
The model’s predictions on macroeconomic aggregates, however, are
worsened with persistent shocks (see 10). Faced with a persistent increase
in the growth rate of TFP, agents increase consumption and leisure, and
reduce investment and labor hours in the short-run. The end result is ac-
tually a slower growing output in the short-run. These predicted patterns
are at odds with the data.
As argued before, a substantial part of the movement in the land price in
the model is generated due to the endogenous decline in land tax rates. An
idea is to make land taxation exogenously given to the model and feed in the
observed changes in the tax rate on land holdings as land tax shocks. This
will generate a sizable increase in the asset prices without influencing the
macroeconomic aggregates by much. This idea has two problems however:
First, it is hard to argue that the decline in the eﬀective tax rates on land in
the 80s came about exogenously and not as a result of the increase in land
33To avoid unreasonable volatility in predicted land prices, I smoothed the series ∆at by
using its 3-lag moving average. This smoothing can be thought of proxying for features
such as Kalman filtering or Bayesian updating on the part agents in regard to their view
of TFP growth. I did not include these features in the model not to complicate the model
any further.
34Note that in the data, the value of corporate land increased by 90% relative to corpo-
rate output. Part of this increase, however, is due to land acquisitions by the corporate
sector and not due to land price increases per se. The total value of land increased by
70% relative to GDP as mentioned in the introduction.
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Figure 9: Simulation with Persistent Shocks: Asset Prices
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Figure 10: Simulation with Persistent Shocks: Macro Aggregates
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values. In fact, there was no decline in the oﬃcial tax rates on land during
this period. What did decline, however, was the assessment values of land
for the purpose of property taxation [Ishi (2001)]. This must have been as
a result of, and not as the cause for, the increase in land prices. In other
words, land taxes magnified the eﬀect of shocks that aﬀected land prices,
but were not themselves the source of these shocks, at least for the late 80s.
Second, even if we make the changes in land tax rates to be exogenously
given in the model, for these to have a sizable eﬀect on land prices, we
still need to assume that agents perceive these changes as very persistent.
In other words, we would still need high persistence, but this time in the
stochastic process for land tax rates.
6 Conclusion
Japanese land and corporate market values increased significantly in the late
80s and then declined in the 90s. This paper uses a neo-classical growth
model to address whether and if so how much of the movements in land and
corporate valuation in Japan can be accounted for by the observed changes
in the growth rate of TFP. The collateral use of land and land taxation
policy that is countercyclical to land prices substantially magnify the eﬀect
of small shocks by reducing the required return on land. With the model
calibrated to Japanese data, I find that the observed changes in fundamen-
tals cannot simultaneously account for the movements in asset prices and
macroeconomic variables. The movements in asset prices (especially land
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prices) can be justified if agents expected the changes in TFP growth to
be very persistent. Persistent TFP growth expectations, however, have
counter-predictions regarding the macroeconomic aggregates.
Future research should test other possible explanations, such as the ef-
fects of monetary policy, to explain the observed movements of asset prices
in Japan. The oﬃcial discount rate of the Bank of Japan was reduced
from 9% to 2.5% between 1980-1989. The eﬀects of this expansionary pol-
icy on asset prices, along with its eﬀects on macroeconomic aggregates, can
be explored within a general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities [c.f.
Bernanke and Gertler (1999)].
Another possible venue for further research is to explore the eﬀects of
real estate prices on the real economy (rather than the other way around).
An increase in the price of real estate can generate a sudden increase in
borrowing and lending due to the use of real estate as collateral. Some of
this new lending, however, may end up financing lower quality investment
projects and can result in an increase in bankruptcies and the reduction of
overall productivity. This interaction between real estate prices and the
real economy may be especially relevant for understanding the prolonged
recession in Japan in the 1990s and assessing the possible eﬀects of the
recent decline in real estate prices in the U.S..
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A Appendix
In this appendix, I briefly describe data sources and the Japanese tax system.
I also provide the proofs for the propositions in section 3.
A.1 Data Sources
The primary sources for the data used in this paper are the Annual Re-
port on National Accounts (ARNA) published by the Economic and Social
Research Institute (ESRI) of the Cabinet Oﬃce of Japan and the Japan
Statistical Yearbook (JSY) published by the Statistics Bureau of Japan.
ARNA contains Gross Domestic Expenditure and Income Accounts based
on the 93 SNA (The UN System of National Accounts of 1993). It also
contains Income, Outlay and Stock Accounts by Institutional Sector.35 I
backtrack the sectoral data to 1980 using several editions of JSY. I also use
JSY for data on labor status, labor hours worked and population by age.36
The Sectoral Accounts contain data on the Non-financial Transactions,
Income Accounts, and Closing Balance Sheets for the Non-financial Corpo-
rate sector, Financial Corporate sector, General Government, and House-
holds and Private Non-profit Institutions. I obtain data on sectoral gross
fixed capital formation, consumption of fixed capital, changes in inventories,
and net purchases of land from the Non-financial Transactions tables. Data
on operating surplus, compensation of employees, taxes on production and
35Recent data contained in ARNA can be accessed from ESRI’s website at
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html.
36Recent JSY data can be found in Statistics Bureau’s website at
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index.htm.
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imports and subsidies are from the sectoral Income Accounts. The year-end
values for tangible assets and financial assets and liabilities of each sector
are obtained from the Closing Balance Sheet Accounts. To arrive at net
debt of corporations, I subtract nonequity financial assets from financial lia-
bilities. Net equity of corporations is found similarly whereby equity assets
are netted out from equity outstanding. The changes in the resulting net
equity numbers align with the changes in the Topix and the Nikkei indexes
fairly well except for the early 80s.37 I take the 1990 level of the net eq-
uity calculated from the National Accounts as the benchmark and use the
change in the Topix index to construct a new net equity series for the years
1980-2002. I use this in my calibration and the plots in the results section.
A.2 The Japanese Tax System
In this subsection, I briefly discuss the Japanese tax system related to land
and corporate valuation as suggested by the model in section 2.38 Special
emphasis is placed on the tax reforms that took place during 1987-88 regard-
ing corporate income taxation and taxation of household savings income and
also the tax reforms regarding land taxation in 1991.
37The equity numbers from the National Accounts suggest a four-fold increase in equity
values between 1984-1989 rather than three-fold as suggested by the Topix and the Nikkei
indexes.
38For a detailed survey of the Japanese tax system and its evolution through the years,
see Ishi (1989, 1993, 2001). This section is mainly derived from those sources.
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A.2.1 Corporate Property Taxation
In Japan, taxes on corporate property (structure and equipment capital and
land) are mainly imposed at the municipality level. The three major tax
items on property holdings of corporations are the property tax, city planning
tax, and the special land-holdings tax. The property tax is imposed on all
tangible assets at a standard rate of 1.4%. The city planning tax is levied on
land and buildings at a rate of 0.3%. The special land-holding tax is levied
on land holdings at a rate of 1.4% and the land portion of the property tax
is deductible for calculations of taxable value. All these taxes suggest that
the statutory tax rates on corporate land and capital are 3.1% and 1.5%
respectively.
The eﬀective tax rate on land is much lower, however, due to the under-
assessment of land values for tax purposes. In Japan, an oﬃcial land valua-
tion (kouji kakaku) is published every year by the National Land Agency to
serve as a tax base for land in diﬀerent regions. In turn, local governments
assess land values for taxation purposes as a ratio of this benchmark price
every three years. The local government assessments are significantly lower
than the oﬃcial values and has gone even further down in the 80s. The
national average for the ratio of assessment to oﬃcial values dropped from
67.4% in 1982 to 36.3% in 1991 [See Ishi (2001)].39 Given that the oﬃcial
land values were already around 70% of their market values, the eﬀective
39The eﬀective tax rates on residential and agricultural land were much lower than
corporate land since the tax base for residential land was reduced by 1/2 to 1/4 of its
assessment value as a special relief. Agricultural land in urban areas were assessed as
residential land, however their tax was exempted if the owners continued farming for 20
years. The 1991 tax reform got rid of this exemption for agricultural land.
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marginal tax rate on corporate land was about 1.4% in early 80s.40 This
ratio dropped to 0.8% by 1991 mainly due to the fall in local government
assessments (see Figure 4 in the introduction). In the tax reform of 1991,
the assessment ratios were raised to 70% of oﬃcial values and also a new
tax on land holdings, the Land Value Tax, was introduced at the national
level starting from 1992. This new tax was levied at a rate of 0.3% (0.2%
in 1992) on land holdings of corporations and individuals. Later it was
reduced to a rate of 0.15% in 1996-97 as a special relief and was suspended
altogether by 1998.
Ishi (2001) reports that the ratio of assessments to oﬃcial land values
in the whole of Japan was 67.4% in 1982, 52.1% in 1985, 47.2% in 1988,
and 36.3% in 1991.41 I use the statutory tax rates, an oﬃcial land price to
market price of 70% for all periods and these reported assessment to oﬃcial
value ratios to arrive at the eﬀective marginal tax rate on land holdings.
I have also assumed that the assessment ratio gradually increased back to
70% by 1996.
A.2.2 Corporate Income Taxation
Corporate income is taxed on all levels of government (national, prefectural
and municipal) in Japan. Before 1990, the national corporate tax entailed
a two-tier system where separate tax rates applied to corporate retained
earnings and income paid out as dividends. The lower tax burden on
40Note that the average tax rate on land and capital holdings were even lower due to
exemptions.
41 In the big cities, the assessment ratios were even lower with only 21.9% in Tokyo area,
and 14.6% in Osaka-city in 1991.
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dividends was intended to encourage dividend payments and higher rates
of equity financing, however was deemed ineﬀective and was phased out
during 1989-90. Within the context of the 1988 tax reform, the tax rate
on retentions was lowered from 42% to 37.5% and the tax rate on dividends
was increased from 32% to 37.5% by 1990.
The local taxes on corporate income are the prefectural and the munic-
ipal inhabitant’s taxes and the prefectural enterprise tax. The inhabitant’s
taxes on corporate income are levied as a surtax on the national corporate
tax, whereby a standard rate of 5% is levied on national corporate tax at the
prefectural level and another 12.3% is levied at the municipal level neither of
which are deductible from the national corporate tax. The enterprise tax,
however, is deductible and it was levied at a rate of 12% on all corporate
income until 1999 when the rate was lowered to 9.6%.42 With all national
and local taxes in mind, the eﬀective tax rates on corporate retentions and
dividends can be calculated as
τ = (1− τ e) [τn (1 + τ i)] + τ e
where τ e is the enterprise tax, τn is the national corporate tax (on retentions
or dividends), and τ i is the sum of prefectural and municipal inhabitant’s
surtaxes. Figure 11 plots this eﬀective marginal tax rate on corporate
income retained and paid as dividends.
The eﬀective corporate income tax rate was around 55% for retained
42Actually not the current year’s, but the previous year’s enterprise tax payments are
deductible. The diﬀerence is negligible, so I treat the current year as deductible in the
tax rate calculations.
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Figure 11: Eﬀective marginal tax rates on corporate income
profits and 45% for dividends before the 1988 reform. With the reform,
these rates have converged to 50% and stayed there until 1998-99 when major
reductions in the national corporate tax and enterprise tax have reduced the
eﬀective corporate income tax rate to 41.5%; close to its counterparts in the
U.S. and Europe.
A.2.3 Dividend and Interest Income Taxation
In Japan, individual income from investments and savings are treated prefer-
entially, and taxed separately from other household income at special rates.
Prior to the tax reforms introduced in 1988, most of the income earned from
interest was tax-exempt. The Maruyu system (tax-exempt small amount
savings) which included deposits at banks, securities companies and other
private institutions allowed a person to save up to 3 million yen tax-free.
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In addition to this, there were exemptions from other interest income from
postal savings, national and local bonds, savings for the formation of em-
ployee assets and postal installment savings for housing. With these ex-
emptions, a couple could save up to the yen equivalent of $180,000 without
paying any taxes on their interest. In eﬀect, around 70% of interest income
was completely tax exempt.
The amount of interest income that exceeded the limits was either taxed
at a flat rate of 35% at source, or at 20% at source with the non-taxed
portion combined with other incomes on the individual tax return; this was
at the choice of the taxpayer. The individual income tax rates are highly
progressive in Japan and ranged from 10 to 75% with 15 brackets before
1984, but most high income groups avoided the high marginal taxes on
their savings income by the separate taxation at source. Assuming 60% of
individuals had a marginal tax on interest income of 0%, and the rest had a
marginal tax rate of 48% (including local taxation), the aggregate marginal
tax rate was around 19% on interest income before 1988. With the 1988
tax reform, a flat 20% tax at source on all interest income was introduced
(15% in national individual income tax and 5% in prefectural inhabitant’s
tax).
The taxes on individual income from corporate dividends are similar to
interest income taxation. Dividend income does not share the generous
exemptions of the Maruyu system, but it may be taxed at a flat rate of 35%
at source, or at 20% at source with the non-taxed portion combined with
other incomes on the individual tax return as in the interest income. For
the local inhabitant’s taxes on individuals, dividend income is treated as any
57
other income and included in comprehensive tax base except for exemptions
for small dividend income. The inhabitant’s taxes are progressive taxes.
On the prefectural level, rates range from 2% to 4% with 3 brackets. On
the municipal level, the tax schedule had 13 brackets ranging from 2.5% to
14% in 1985, 7 brackets ranging from 3% to 12% in 1987, 4 brackets ranging
from 3-12% in 1992 and only 3 brackets with 3%, 8%, and 10% rates in
2000. There’s a special tax credit on the national level applied to dividend
income whereby 10% of dividend income is deductible from individual tax-
able income. Given these considerations, the eﬀective marginal tax rate on
dividend income can be calculated as
τ = 0.35 + τ i − (0.1 ∗ τn)
where τn is the national income tax on individuals and τ i is the sum of
prefectural and municipal inhabitant’s taxes on individual income. I have
assumed that all shareholders choose to be taxed at the separate rate of 35%
at source for the national tax and deduct 10% of dividend income from their
comprehensive taxable income. This is not unreasonable given that national
individual income taxes are high and progressive ranging from 10.5% to 70%
in 1985.43 Considering a 3% prefectural, 10% municipal and 30% national
tax rate on individual income, the eﬀective marginal tax rate on individual
dividend income is 45%.
43The top bracket for individual national income was reduced to 60% in 1987, and to
50% in 1989.
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A.3 Proofs of Propositions
A.3.1 Proposition 1
The proof follows from the first order conditions of the households and and
corporations with respect to debt holdings. From the households, we have
Et {pt+1 [1 + (1− τ b) rb,t]}+ µ1,t = pt
where µ1,t is the multiplier on the nonnegativity constraint of debt. From
the corporations, we get
Et {pt+1 [1 + (1− τy) rb,t]}− µ2,t + µ3,t = pt
where µ2,t is the multiplier on the nonnegativity constraint of debt, and µ3,t
is the multiplier on the collateral constraint of debt. The two conditions
above imply
Et [pt+1 (τy − τ b) rb,t] = µ3,t − µ2,t − µ1,t
Note that all the multipliers are nonnegative, and when the collateral con-
straint binds, the nonnegativity constraints do not (and vice versa). When
τy > τ b, the left side of the above expression is strictly positive. This can
only happen when µ3,t, the multiplier on the collateral constraint is strictly
positive and the nonnegativity constraints do not bind, i.e. µ1,t = µ2,t = 0.
On the other hand, when τy > τ b, the left side is strictly negative. This can
only happen when the nonnegativity constraints bind, i.e. µ1,t and µ2,t > 0,
and the collateral constraint does not bind, i.e. µ3,t = 0. When τy = τ b,
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the left side is zero; hence all multipliers are zero which is consistent with
any debt value between 0 and φ [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1] .¥
A.3.2 Proposition 2
The result follows from the first order condition of corporations with respect
to land holdings and the collateral constraint. When τy > τ b, the collateral
constraint binds and the first order condition of corporations with respect
to lt+1 can be written as
Et
∙
pt+1
pt
½
(1− τy) θl
yt+1
lt+1
+ qt+1 − [1 + (1− τy) rb,t]φqt −
Ωt+1
l
¾¸
= (1− φ) qt.
First note that
Ωt+1
l
= τ l (Ωt+1, qt+1) qt+1
Along the balanced growth path,
pt+1
pt
= β (γ/η)α(1−σ)−1 and rb =
pt
pt+1
− 1
(1− τ b)
.
Also
τ l (Ωt+1, qt+1) = τ l and lt+1 = l.
Replacing the above expressions into the first order condition with respect
to land (after some algebra) yields the value of land relative to output in
balanced growth.¥
60
A.3.3 Proposition 3
The proof follows from the first order condition of the stand-in household
with respect to firm shares and the first order conditions of the corpora-
tions with respect to capital, land, and labor. The household’s problem in
equilibrium implies
Et
n
pt+1
h³
1− τhd
´
dt+1 + vt+1
io
= ptvt.
Imposing the binding collateral constraint, the corporations’ first order con-
ditions with respect to capital, land and labor are given by
Et
⎡
⎢⎣pt+1
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− τy) θk yt+1kt+1 + (1− τx) (1− δ)
+τyδ − τk − [1 + (1− τy) rb,t]φ (1− τx)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
⎤
⎥⎦ = pt (1− φ) (1− τx)
Et
⎡
⎢⎣pt+1
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− τy) θl yt+1lt+1 + qt+1
− [1 + (1− τy) rb,t]φqt − Ωt+1l
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
⎤
⎥⎦ = pt (1− φ) qt
wtNtht = θhyt
respectively. These conditions coupled with the collateral constraint and
the definition of dividends imply (after some algebra)
Et
"
pt+1
(³
1− τhd
´
dt+1 +
¡
1− τhd
¢£
1−
¡
τy − τ cd
¢¤ [(1− τx) kt+2 + qt+1lt+2 − bt+2])#
= pt
¡
1− τhd
¢£
1−
¡
τy − τ cd
¢¤ [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1 − bt+1]
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This is consistent with the equilibrium condition of the stand-in household
(and the transversality condition) if and only if
vt =
¡
1− τhd
¢£
1−
¡
τy − τ cd
¢¤ [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1 − bt+1] .
Using the binding collateral constraint for debt and rearranging the tax
terms, the value of equity can be written as
vt =
∙
1− τ
h
d + τ
c
d − τy
1 + τ cd − τy
¸
(1− φ) [(1− τx) kt+1 + qtlt+1]
which completes the proof.¥
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